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hen assessing government policies, economists are guided by certain
basic principles. To determine the provision of public goods, econo-
mists use cost-beneﬁt analysis: A public good should be provided if, and
to the degree that, its beneﬁts—the sum of all individuals’ beneﬁts—exceed its
costs, in accordance with what is known as the “Samuelson rule.” To solve problems
involving negative externalities, economists favor internalization: Actors should be
made to bear the full social costs of their decisions, such as by imposing taxes equal
to the marginal external cost of their activities—“Pigouvian taxation.”
Two difﬁculties with these principles are often raised. First, distributive effects
are implicitly ignored. But if a public good disproportionately favors the poor,
should it perhaps be provided beyond the level at which the beneﬁts otherwise
justify its cost? Likewise, if a gasoline tax is regressive, should it be set below the level
that would optimally address air pollution externalities?
Second, the distortionary cost of income taxation is disregarded even though
the pertinent public policies affect the government’s revenue needs. If, however,
public goods implicitly carry an additional price because they must be ﬁnanced via
distortionary taxation, should the public sector be scaled back relative to what is
indicated by the standard cost-beneﬁt test? Similarly, should environmental taxes
be set higher than necessary to internalize externalities because they produce a
“double dividend,” not only correcting externalities but also raising revenue and
thus reducing the need to rely on distortionary income taxation?
My thesis in this essay is that the two asserted difﬁculties do not have the
commonly assumed implications. Instead, economists’ traditional principles
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suggest that it is most helpful to contemplate policy experiments—consisting of
underlying policies like provision of public goods combined with income tax
adjustments—that are distribution neutral overall. As will be seen, this formulation
not only renders distributive concerns moot, but also, in standard cases, implies
that there will be no effects on labor supply either. This approach is introduced
through simple examples followed by a more general statement, discussions of
qualiﬁcations and connections to classical and contemporary literature, and sug-
gestions for analysts and policymakers.
Offsetting Tax Adjustments: Some Examples
Public goods must be ﬁnanced, and environmental taxes and subsidies need to
be accompanied by some other ﬁscal adjustment if budget balance is to remain
unaffected. Yet there are myriad ways in which budget balance may be achieved
even if one conﬁnes attention, as is common in the literature, to modiﬁcations of
the income tax system (taken here, following custom in such work, as a composite
of income, sales, and payroll taxes as well as all manner of transfer programs).
Furthermore, different income tax adjustments entail different consequences for
the distribution of income and for labor supply. Compare, for example, raising a
given amount of revenue by increasing tax rates on the rich versus adding a ﬁxed
dollar amount to everyone’s tax bill. The former may be superior on distributive
grounds, but also more distortionary.
What adjustment to the income tax system should analysts consider? First,
consistency has virtues; otherwise, similar analyses of otherwise identical policies
could reach widely different conclusions due entirely to disparities in ad hoc
assumptions about how the policies will be ﬁnanced. Second, of the many (consis-
tent) ways that one could adjust the income tax system to achieve budget balance,
ideally the intrinsic features of providing a public good or correcting an externality
would not become entangled with concerns about the proper extent of income
redistribution. Therefore, a distribution-neutral approach to policy analysis is
warranted.
Accordingly, in each example that follows, a beneﬁt-offsetting income tax
adjustment will be constructed: a tax adjustment that, combined with the policy
itself, is distribution neutral. As it turns out, this combination of policy and ﬁnance
mechanism leaves labor supply unaffected. Since both distribution and labor supply
remain unchanged, traditional principles like the cost-beneﬁt test will provide
proper guidance.
Public Good with Uniform Beneﬁts
Consider a public good that provides uniform dollar beneﬁts to everyone, say
$100 per capita. A beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment is one that charges each
individual $100. The result of the package of public good and ﬁnance is obviously
160 Journal of Economic Perspectivesdistribution neutral. It also (absent subtle complications, discussed below) does not
affect labor supply because the beneﬁt and the tax adjustment are offsetting and,
in addition, each is a ﬁxed amount that is independent of income and thus labor
effort.
Suppose further that the cost of this public good is only $90 per capita, in
which case the simple cost-beneﬁt test is passed. Because there would be a budget
surplus if everyone’s taxes were raised by $100, the tax adjustment could be limited
to $90, in which case everyone would be better off. Conversely, if the cost exceeds
the beneﬁt, the tax adjustment would have to be greater than $100, and all would
be worse off. The simple cost-beneﬁt test thus correctly indicates whether it makes
sense to provide this public good given that ﬁnance will be through a beneﬁt-
offsetting tax adjustment.
Might this method of ﬁnance be deemed objectionable because it is tanta-
mount to a lump-sum tax? Not really. First, a uniform lump-sum tax—more
precisely, a uniform adjustment to the tax and transfer system—is quite feasible
(unlike imagined lump-sum taxes that would vary with unobservable characteristics
like individuals’ abilities). Second, the familiar distributive objection to the whole-
sale use of lump-sum taxes is inapplicable here. A uniform upward adjustment in
tax obligations is to be imposed to ﬁnance a public good that itself produces a
uniform per capita beneﬁt. If everyone pays an additional $90 to receive a beneﬁt
that each values at $100, there is a Pareto improvement involving an equal gain for
all. The situation is not materially different from one in which a private good that
costs $90 to produce is sold on a competitive market for $90 to individuals of
various income levels who each value one unit of the good at $100. Distributive
objections are inapposite.
Might one instead complain that the example is unrealistic, in that much
government activity beneﬁts higher-income individuals more than the poor, in
which case such ﬁnance would result in a package that is regressive overall? Yes, this
example is atypical, which is why we will now consider examples in which the
distributive incidence differs. Interestingly, however, these examples will make
clear that uniform (lump-sum) ﬁnance really has nothing fundamental to do with
the distribution-neutral approach, except by coincidence, as in this ﬁrst example.
Public Good with Beneﬁts Proportional to Income
To address the possibility that beneﬁts from government projects may vary with
income, consider now a case in which a public good produces beneﬁts that rise in
proportion to income.
1 For example, suppose that a major expansion of the police
force would be valued by all individuals at 1 percent of income, perhaps because
those with higher incomes receive more direct beneﬁt on account of their possess-
ing more valuable goods that would be better protected against theft.
For a public good that produces a beneﬁt valued by everyone at 1 percent of
1 To be precise, after-tax (disposable) income is the relevant concept in the present example; this
qualiﬁer is omitted throughout for expositional convenience.
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1 percent of income in taxes (or has transfers reduced accordingly). At this point,
the analysis proceeds as in the foregoing example. If (and only if) the beneﬁts of
expanding the police force exceed the costs, there will be a budget surplus.
Although the form of the tax adjustment is quite different in this example, it
remains the case that the beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment, true to its name, raises
revenue equal to the dollar sum of everyone’s beneﬁts. Thus, when beneﬁts exceed
costs, tax collections exceed expenditures. Accordingly, a smaller tax increase is
sufﬁcient to balance the budget, and everyone can be made better off. Once again,
by construction we have a distribution-neutral outcome, so no adjustment to the
cost-beneﬁt test is warranted on account of distributive concerns.
But what about labor supply? Won’t work be discouraged—beyond the distor-
tion caused by the preexisting income tax—because 1 percent is added to every-
one’s tax obligations? The answer for the basic case (again, qualiﬁcations are noted
below) is no: Any labor supply effect of the tax increase will be just offset by the
labor supply effect of the public good. This point deserves some elaboration.
Suppose that an individual contemplates working harder by just enough to
earn an additional $100. Compared to the original regime—without the public
good worth 1 percent of income and without the 1 percent tax adjustment—the
individual will keep $1 less on account of the reform package. However, by
assumption it is also true that the utility value of the additional earnings, translated
into dollars, is $1 greater on account of the reform package. Indeed, this is what it
means to say that the value of the beneﬁt equals 1 percent of income. Put
concretely, increasing one’s earnings is more valuable than before because it is less
likely that one will lose to theft the fruits of one’s additional efforts. Combining this
project beneﬁt with the effect of the beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment, an individ-
ual’s net utility gain or loss from working harder is precisely the same after the
reform as it was beforehand.
2 As a consequence, labor supply is unaffected. Since,
as noted, the overall reform package is also distribution neutral, the simple cost-
beneﬁt test is sufﬁcient for our assessment.
Gasoline Tax Increase with Incidence and Beneﬁts that Vary with Income
To appreciate the generality of the proposed approach, it is useful to consider
one ﬁnal example that examines the control of externalities rather than a public
good and that incorporates a number of additional variations. Some government
policies, like environmental taxes, directly raise revenue and in ways that may affect
distribution and labor supply. Many policies, including most government regula-
2 The analysis is more subtle when the reason that the value of a public good rises with income is the
declining marginal utility of consumption. For example, if utility is additively separable in public goods,
private goods, and labor, this will be the only reason value would rise with income. For analysis of this
case, see Kaplow (1996, appendix, second example). Though the particulars differ from the case in the
text, the conclusion is the same, a point that should be reinforced by the discussion and diagram
accompanying the next example.
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tionship with income, not just being constant in dollars or strictly proportional to
income as in the preceding two examples.
To illustrate how the present approach can take all such complications into
account, consider an increase in the gasoline tax motivated by a desire to internal-
ize externalities such as pollution and perhaps trafﬁc congestion. This example is
depicted in Figure 1. The gasoline tax increase itself is assumed to be regressive,
with an incidence that rises, although less than proportionately, with income. This
relationship is shown by the dotted curve, which is drawn below the horizontal axis
because tax payments constitute a loss to individuals.
The gasoline tax increase is also assumed to affect gasoline consumption.
Individuals may drive less, purchase different vehicles, and so forth. These behav-
ioral responses entail ﬁnancial costs and forgone utility to individuals, but also
produce beneﬁts, here assumed to be reduced pollution and less congestion. As the
dashed curve indicates, this net effect, “project beneﬁts  nontax costs” (ignoring
the gasoline tax payments themselves), is assumed to be positive and rising with
income at an increasing rate. That is, these net project beneﬁts are hypothesized to
be worth disproportionately more to the rich, perhaps because clean air and saved
time are much more valuable to them.
The solid curve shows that the net impact of the project—consisting of the
gasoline tax payments combined with these project beneﬁts and nontax costs—is a
moderate net loss to lower-income individuals and a rising net gain to higher-
income individuals.
The offsetting (and in this case nonlinear) adjustment to the income tax
schedule in this case can be determined straightaway. It is the same solid net impact
curve, except that it must be interpreted as a payout rather than a receipt (hence
the negative sign in the label on Figure 1). After all, the tax schedule adjustment
is constructed to offset, at each level of income, the net beneﬁts of the project. It
follows immediately that no distributive concern is raised either by the fact that the
gasoline tax increase is, in itself, regressive or by the fact that the net beneﬁts of the
gasoline tax disproportionately favor the rich. The offsetting tax adjustment washes
away these distributive effects.
Moreover, it is again the case that there is no overall effect on labor supply. To
be sure, the gasoline tax increase in isolation may well have reduced labor supply
because those who earn more pay more on this account. Conversely, the net
beneﬁts (project beneﬁts  nontax costs) in isolation may have increased labor
supply because they are rising with income and thus make the prospect of increased
earnings more attractive. Why is it that the net effect of all these components on
labor supply must be nil at every level of income?
The answer arises from the very nature of the construct of a beneﬁt-offsetting
income tax adjustment. We can determine the net effect of all aspects of the
gasoline tax increase combined with the income tax adjustment from Figure 1.
Subtract the solid curve, representing the income tax adjustment, from itself, this
time representing the net impact of the gasoline tax increase. Obviously, the result
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of income that an individual may earn, the individual’s utility without the reform is
identical to the individual’s utility in a world with the reform. Hence, whatever level
of labor effort was best for the individual initially, that same level of labor effort will
be optimal after enactment.
To complete the analysis, observe that the hypothesized offsetting adjustment
to the income tax schedule will result in a budget surplus—allowing one to reduce
everyone’s taxes somewhat, making everyone better off—if and only if the gasoline
tax increase is cost-beneﬁcial by traditional measures. That is, if the gasoline tax
moves in the direction of internalizing an externality, all stand to gain from its
implementation, ﬁnanced in a manner that is overall distribution neutral. This is
true because, at each income level, the beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment equals the
direct beneﬁts minus compliance costs and gasoline tax payments. Hence, sum-
ming across the population, the net budgetary impact (before the rebate) will
simply equal the difference between total beneﬁts and total costs, just as in the prior
two examples.
In sum, the reform package as a whole is distribution neutral, has no effect on
labor supply, and produces a budget surplus that can be rebated so as to beneﬁt
everyone if and only if the traditional policy test is satisﬁed.
Elaboration and Qualiﬁcations
The General Claim and Its Underlying Intuition
With these three examples in mind, it is useful to state the general claim more
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Figure 1
Gasoline Tax Increase and Offsetting Income Tax Adjustment
164 Journal of Economic Perspectivesto the point that labor supply is unaffected when a government project is ﬁnanced
using a beneﬁt-offsetting income tax adjustment.
3
To begin, the beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment is a modiﬁcation to the entire
income tax (and transfer) schedule. At each income level, the increase or reduc-
tion in the amount of tax owed is deﬁned to be that amount that individuals would
have to pay or receive such that their utility with the government project and the
income tax adjustment is the same as their utility without either one. Stated more
precisely, let u(l) denote an individual’s reduced-form utility as a function of labor
supply in the initial regime and u°(l) denote the individual’s utility function in the
regime with the government project (but no tax adjustment). To maintain com-
mon units, it is convenient to express the beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment in utility
rather than dollars. Therefore, we have t(l)  u°(l)  u(l), where t(l) indicates
the amount by which utility is reduced by the tax adjustment at each level of labor
supply. (That the same tax adjustment works for all individuals, regardless of
earning ability, depends on homogeneity of preferences and what is referred to as
weak leisure separability, as will be explained below when discussing qualiﬁcations.)
Given this construction of the offsetting income tax adjustment, the reform
combined with the tax adjustment will affect neither labor supply nor distribution.
An individual’s utility after the reform (including the tax adjustment) is simply
u°(l)  t(l), which by construction of t(l) just equals u(l), utility before the
reform. Thus, whatever level of labor supply maximized utility initially must also be
the level of labor supply that maximizes utility with the reform and the tax
adjustment. Moreover, because everyone’s utility is the same as before, distribution
is also unaffected.
Accordingly, the reform—whether a change in the level of a public good,
correction of an externality, or any other government activity—will make sense if
and only if the government is left with a budget surplus, which can be rebated to
the population. Furthermore, as discussed in the three examples, whether a surplus
is generated is determined exactly by a standard cost-beneﬁt test. After all, the
offsetting tax adjustment is deﬁned to soak up each individual’s net beneﬁts from
the reform. Thus, if the sum of everyone’s net beneﬁts is positive, revenue is
positive.
At this point, it should be clear that the logic of the argument does not depend
on the type of government reform, the distributive incidence of any costs or
beneﬁts, or any particular assumptions about the distortionary nature of labor
income taxation. The reason is that everything—except the net beneﬁts of the
reform itself—is held constant using the offsetting tax adjustment.
4 The intuition
3 For a formal analysis of the general case and some worked-out special cases, see the appendix in
Kaplow (1996). Subsequent formal analysis also appears in Auerbach and Hines (2002) and Kaplow
(2003).
4 The only exception under present assumptions is that the further step of rebating the surplus will tend
to reduce labor supply and thus revenue. The only implication is that the actual budget-balancing rebate
will be less than the full per capita amount of the original budget surplus.
Louis Kaplow 165behind this conclusion is reinforced by considering that the proposed beneﬁt-
offsetting tax adjustment is a sort of “beneﬁt taxation” (Kaplow, 1996, 2003).
Because whatever individuals pay is equal to the value of what they receive, and this
relationship holds at every level of earnings, it should not be surprising that labor
supply will be unaffected.
Qualiﬁcations
Is it always true that basic principles, like the Samuelson cost-beneﬁt test for
public goods and the Pigouvian prescription for internalizing externalities, provide
precisely the correct policy prescriptions when ﬁnance is distribution neutral? The
answer, unsurprisingly, is: Of course not. The world is never so simple. It is useful
to explore the most important qualiﬁcations, both to appreciate the limitations of
the foregoing analysis and to reinforce the intuition that underlies it. As will be
seen, although many of the qualiﬁcations suggest that the basic rules may not be
precisely right and sometimes may be signiﬁcantly off, deviations are not systemat-
ically in any particular direction. Moreover, when modiﬁcations are appropriate in
light of these qualiﬁcations, they tend to be different in kind from those called for
by the conventional concerns about distribution and labor supply distortion that
were mentioned at the outset.
One qualiﬁcation concerns the possibility that government projects may affect
labor supply indirectly.
5 (This possibility was ruled out above in the passing refer-
ence to the assumption of weak leisure separability.)
6 Consider a public good that
consists of improved national parks and beaches or an environmental regulation
whose primary effect is to increase the quality of such recreational destinations.
These government actions make leisure more attractive, ceteris paribus, and thus
induce individuals to reduce labor supply. Given that labor supply is already
distorted downward by redistributive taxation, this effect is socially costly. As a
consequence, it will tend to be optimal on second-best grounds to supply somewhat
less of these public goods and to control such externalities less than otherwise.
Conversely, public goods and environmental regulations that enhance the ambi-
ence of central cities may increase labor supply because they increase the utility
associated with work. Accordingly, such public goods and environmental regula-
tions would optimally be provided at higher levels or set more stringently than
otherwise. Note that the direction of these modiﬁcations does not depend on the
distributive incidence of the government project (which will be offset by the tax
5 Pertinent literatures, notably on optimal income taxation, have identiﬁed other subtle qualiﬁcations
such as interactions with income-earning ability, which is assumed to be unobservable (for example,
Mirrlees, 1976).
6 Formally, weak leisure separability means that if, say, utility is a function of vectors of private goods x,
public goods g, and externalities e, as well as labor supply—that is, we have u(x, g, e, l)—it is possible
to write the utility function in the form u(v(x, g, e), l), where v is a subutility function. Intuitively, this
separability means that individuals’ tradeoffs among private goods, public goods, and externalities are
unaffected by the level of labor they choose to supply.
166 Journal of Economic Perspectivesadjustment) and does not reﬂect any simple preference for lower government
spending or for policies that incidentally raise additional revenue.
A second caveat to the claim that standard policy prescriptions produce Pareto
improvements is due to the heterogeneity of individuals’ preferences (Boadway and
Keen, 1993; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Kaplow, 1996). The beneﬁt-offsetting
tax adjustment at any income level may only reﬂect the average beneﬁts to indi-
viduals at that income level. Thus, individuals with atypically strong tastes for the
government project will gain, even accounting for the tax adjustment, and those
with weaker tastes will lose. (This assumes that individuals’ differences are unob-
servable, rendering customized tax adjustments infeasible.) For example, expendi-
tures to improve parks will beneﬁt those individuals who love the out-of-doors but
provide little gain to those who prefer watching television. When ﬁnanced with an
offsetting tax adjustment equal to average gains, the former will be winners, but the
latter may well be losers, even though the project passes the standard cost-beneﬁt
test. Although the presence of such heterogeneity usually makes Pareto improve-
ments impossible, it does not have systematic implications regarding whether
various policy tests should be more or less stringent. However, in particular situa-
tions, heterogeneity may bear on the desirability of government activity. For exam-
ple, enhanced police protection may be relatively more beneﬁcial to individuals
who, even holding income constant, are overall worse off: those who are relatively
weak or otherwise vulnerable. Given certain social preferences for equality, this
factor may favor a higher level of provision than would otherwise be optimal.
Nevertheless, the present concern about heterogeneity does not pertain to the
overall distribution of income—which is held constant by the beneﬁt-offsetting tax
adjustment—but rather involves only disparities among individuals at the same
income level. Likewise, this qualiﬁcation does not relate in any direct way to the
distortionary cost of redistributive taxation.
A third qualiﬁcation takes account of certain costs of taxation itself, other than
labor supply distortion, as discussed in Ng (2000) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001).
There are administrative and compliance costs associated with tax collections and
problems of evasion. These frictions do imply that there is a marginal cost of public
funds, although not on the order of magnitude of labor supply distortion.
7 These
outlays are directly analogous to costs that arise with market provision of private
goods, such as the expense of collecting payment and losses due to shoplifting. In
addition, actual tax systems discriminate among various activities. Different assets
may be taxed at differential rates, tax preferences exist for certain fringe beneﬁts,
and other discrepancies abound. These imperfections further contribute to the
cost of raising revenue. (The implication of such costs is not unambiguous; for
example, when budgets are tight, the need for additional funds sometimes leads to
7 This conclusion is especially true in light of the fact that distortion tends to rise disproportionately with
(in simple cases, with the square of) the marginal tax rate, which for labor income (including
income, payroll, and consumption taxes) is usually estimated for the United States to be just over 40
percent.
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as with the ﬁrst two qualiﬁcations, such complications do not relate directly either
to the distributive incidence of the public project in question or to the distortion
of labor supply.
These three qualiﬁcations and others that could be adduced indicate, as one
would expect, that simple principles like the cost-beneﬁt test are not literally
correct and sometimes may need signiﬁcant modiﬁcation. Note that, for the most
part, the necessary adjustments may go in either direction, and they are not
determined in any simple manner by the two worries with which we began,
concerning distribution and labor supply distortion.
History of Thought on Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion
Classic Statements
Scholarship on rules of policy analysis—which has focused on public goods
and externalities, along with worries about distribution and labor supply
distortion—can usefully be clustered into three overlapping waves. The ﬁrst con-
sists of classic statements of fundamental principles.
The cost-beneﬁt test for public goods is due to Samuelson’s (1954) elegant
articulation half a century ago in “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” in
which he showed that optimality involves equating the sum of individuals’ marginal
beneﬁts to the marginal cost of provision. Interestingly for present purposes,
Samuelson’s formulation is explicitly in a ﬁrst-best setting in which individualized
lump-sum taxes in principle allow any social welfare optimum to be achieved,
without labor supply distortion.
The command to internalize externalities is inspired by Pigou’s (1920) classic,
The Economics of Welfare. His exposition is notable both for his diagnosis of the
problem of divergences between private and social costs and beneﬁts and for his
suggesting the use of taxes and subsidies as a possible cure. In the case of negative
externalities, the prescription is to impose a tax equal to the marginal external
harm.
Musgrave’s (1959) pioneering treatise, The Theory of Public Finance, suggests an
analytical division between efﬁciency and distribution issues. He advances the view
that government can be understood as divided into imaginary branches, including
an Allocation Branch that focuses on maximizing efﬁciency by providing public
goods and controlling externalities and a Distribution Branch that specializes in
addressing distributive concerns. If such a separation is entirely valid, it suggests
that ﬁrst-best principles should guide decisions about government projects while
concerns about distribution should be in the exclusive province of those tasked to
redistribute income.
Revisionist Accounts
A second wave of literature, which continues to the present day, advances
reservations regarding income distribution and labor supply distortion. Thus,
168 Journal of Economic PerspectivesWeisbrod (1968), Dre `ze and Stern (1987), and others emphasize the need to
employ distributive weights in cost-beneﬁt analysis to account for the distributive
incidence of public projects. In regulating externalities, distributive apprehensions
are widespread; as one example, Casler and Raﬁqui (1993) examine distributive
concerns related to fuel taxes.
Regarding distortion, concerns were raised with respect to the cost of provid-
ing public goods at least as early as another of Pigou’s (1928) classics, A Study in
Public Finance. Work on the subject accelerated in the early 1970s as part of the
explosion of interest in optimal taxation (Atkinson and Stern, 1974; Diamond and
Mirrlees, 1971; Stiglitz and Dasgupta, 1971; subsequent research was elucidated in
this journal in Ballard and Fullerton, 1992). More recently, economists have
examined whether various regulatory schemes might produce a “double dividend”;
that is, an environmental tax might both correct an externality and also raise
additional revenue without distorting labor supply (Ballard and Medema, 1993;
Cordes, Nicholson and Sammartino, 1990). Subsequent investigations indicate that
a double dividend may be unlikely, suggesting instead that environmental regula-
tion tends to exacerbate the preexisting distortion of labor supply (Bovenberg and
Goulder, 2002; Goulder, 2002).
The second-wave literature pursues a plausible agenda of determining how
simple rules of policy analysis should be modiﬁed to account for policies’ distrib-
utive effects and for labor supply distortion associated with income taxation.
Unfortunately, the results are often incomplete and misleading, primarily for two
reasons.
The ﬁrst problem concerns which income tax adjustments are assumed to be
used to ﬁnance public goods or accompany the regulation of externalities. In some
instances, such as in the aforementioned literature on the use of distributive
weights in cost-beneﬁt analysis, no tax adjustment is speciﬁed, in which case analysis
is conﬁned to an implicitly incomplete policy that consists of the government
project with ﬁnancing left in the air. More often, the income tax is adjusted to
balance the budget, but the tax adjustment chosen varies from one study to another
and, in any event, is more or less arbitrary. When the tax adjustment is not a
distributively offsetting one, however, any result concerning labor supply is possi-
ble, depending on whether the project combined with the hypothesized tax adjust-
ment increases or reduces redistribution.
Signiﬁcant portions of the work on public goods and environmental regulation
tend to ﬁnd adverse effects on labor supply, and this—it should now be no
surprise—reﬂects the implicit use of tax adjustments that increase redistribution.
With public goods, a study might report, say, a marginal cost of public funds of
$1.45 rather than $1.00. This cost can arise, for example, by combining a project
that produces uniform dollar beneﬁts with a tax adjustment consisting of an
increase in everyone’s marginal income tax rate, such as in one of the cases
considered by Ballard and Fullerton (1992) and others in which the public good is
assumed to be a substitute for private consumption. Obviously, this package is more
redistributive. With environmental regulation, some literature, for example, on
Louis Kaplow 169pollution quotas (surveyed in Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002) compares otherwise
equivalent regulatory regimes that have different revenue consequences, where
budget balance is achieved by changing marginal income tax rates. In such cases,
the environmental regimes that raise more revenue are less distortionary; however,
because the distortion reduction is a consequence of reduced reliance on income
taxation, these regimes are also less redistributive. Other literature on public goods
and regulation in essence utilizes tax adjustments that have an incidence propor-
tional to income whereas hypothesized beneﬁts rise with income less than propor-
tionally, as a consequence of subtle modeling assumptions.
8 The result is that
greater public goods provision or environmental protection adversely affects labor
supply because it implicitly is more redistributive.
The second problem is that much work on the marginal cost of public funds
(surveyed in Ballard and Fullerton, 1992) and on environmental regulation (for
example, numerical assessments of green tax reforms, surveyed in Bovenberg and
Goulder, 2002) considers efﬁciency but ignores redistribution. This selective focus
is particularly worrisome precisely because, as just explained, the overall package of
policy reform and income tax adjustment that is analyzed in second-wave literature
often entails increases in the extent of redistribution. The omission of redistributive
beneﬁts may nominally be justiﬁed by the fact that these studies frequently employ
representative-individual models in which everyone is identical. However, the
raison d’e ˆtre of labor income taxation—the source of much distortion in this
literature—is redistribution among nonidentical individuals. Hence, it is problem-
atic to offer a welfare assessment that depends heavily on how changes in the level
of such taxation affect labor supply when the setting involves redistributive effects
running in the opposite direction that are artiﬁcially assumed to be inconsequential.
These two shortcomings in the second-wave literature’s attempt to address
distribution and labor supply distortion motivate further inquiry. It is necessary to
8 As Ballard and Fullerton (1992) explain, if the public project is independent of labor supply, the
marginal cost of public funds will exceed one when the uncompensated labor supply curve is upward
sloping, as is often assumed. However, taking the simple case of additive separability of private
consumption, public beneﬁt (public good or environmental protection) and labor, this condition for an
adverse effect on labor supply is a sufﬁcient condition for an increase in redistribution. (The intuition
is that the condition requires that the income effect not be too great, meaning that the marginal utility
of consumption does not fall very rapidly, which directly implies that the marginal value of the public
beneﬁt does not rise sharply as a function of income.) Another subtle source of increased redistribution
appears in studies of environmental regulation that hold the value of income transfers constant in real
terms (for example, Goulder, Parry, Williams and Burtraw, 1999). In this case, the poorest individuals
are made whole with regard to private goods and net taxes through the stipulated adjustments to the
tax-transfer system, and they furthermore beneﬁt as environmental protection rises; the rich, through
steeper marginal income tax rates, in essence pay for both their own environmental beneﬁts and a share
of others’ beneﬁts. These sorts of phenomena are not readily apparent because most of this work does
not report the distributive incidence of environmental beneﬁts or of regulatory and tax costs. Additional
examples are presented by Allgood and Snow (1998), who show that a substantial portion of differences
in leading empirical estimates of the marginal cost of funds and of redistribution can be attributable to
subtle ways in which different authors’ simulations implicitly change the level of effective lump-sum
transfers and thus the extent of redistribution assumed to take place.
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Furthermore, it is important to integrate analysis of distribution and labor supply
distortion rather than treating the issues separately. These two demands motivate
the present analysis, which draws on another set of contributions.
New View
A third wave of work on rules of policy analysis, which might be characterized
as offering a “new view” on distribution and labor supply distortion, has gradually
emerged. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), in an important but underappreciated
article, use the device of beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustments to show that distributive
weights are unnecessary in cost-beneﬁt analysis. Shavell (1981) employs a similar
construct to demonstrate that legal rules should be assessed without regard to their
distributive effects. Technical papers by Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and
Keen (1993) show that in basic cases, if income taxes are set optimally, the simple
cost-beneﬁt test for public goods provision provides proper guidance. This latter
work takes advantage of the fact that, when at the optimum, the marginal beneﬁt
of additional redistribution equals the marginal cost of additional labor supply
distortion, so marginal adjustments to the tax system have no net effect on social
welfare. Kaplow (1996) advances the broader view that worries about both distri-
bution and labor supply distortion tend to be misconceived with regard to a wide
domain of government policy, notably including regulation as well as public goods,
using the approach of offsetting tax adjustments that does not depend on the
income tax system being at an optimum. Subsequent related work includes Ng
(2000) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001).
The teachings of the new view can also be analogized to earlier work on when
it is optimal to employ differential commodity taxation when an income tax is also
available. Speciﬁcally, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that it is optimal to tax or
subsidize a private good (relative to a baseline of uniform treatment) only to the
extent that it is, respectively, a complement of or substitute for leisure.
9 (The
intuition for their result parallels the above explanation of why it is optimal, say, to
provide more or less of a public good than indicated by the standard cost-beneﬁt
test, depending on the relationship between the public good and preferences for
leisure.) That is, in the basic case, the simple rule that commodities should be taxed
uniformly is correct, even in a setting in which distribution matters and income
taxation distorts labor supply. The present analysis of a range of government
policies can be seen as a sort of corollary to this important result of Atkinson and
Stiglitz by observing, for example, that providing less of a public good or setting a
9 Mirrlees (1976) and Konishi (1995) note the connection between public goods provision and optimal
commodity taxation, and Kaplow (1996) discusses the implications more broadly. Atkinson and Stiglitz’s
(1976) demonstration makes use of the optimality of the income tax. Kaplow (2004) extends the result
to any income tax, using a beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment instead of relying on properties of the
optimum.
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private good relative to other goods.
10
The Virtues of Distribution-Neutral Policy Analysis
The framework advanced in this essay employs beneﬁt-offsetting income tax
adjustments that render moot familiar concerns about distribution and labor
supply distortion. But what if some other tax adjustment might be utilized? In that
case, analysts might wish to examine the tax adjustment actually speciﬁed in a
current proposal. However, the tax adjustment may not be speciﬁed at all, it may
vary across proposals, or it may change. Speciﬁcation may also be meaningless
because the tax adjustment being proposed (say, closing a particular tax loophole)
is likely to be one with sufﬁcient legislative support that it would be used to ﬁnance
a subsequent proposal if the current one is not enacted. In addition, as time passes,
both projects and methods of ﬁnance will each evolve in their own directions. If
one had to speculate about how redistribution would ultimately tend to be affected
by government projects, it seems plausible to suppose, as a ﬁrst approximation, that
the long-run political equilibrium regarding redistribution will not be affected in
an obvious, predictable manner by this or that government action, which would
justify an assumption of distribution-neutral ﬁnance as the baseline for analysis.
There should in any event be a standard method of analyzing policy packages
that separates the intrinsic merits of the policy from matters of redistribution. As
suggested in Kaplow (1996), it is useful to imagine that any proposed policy and
associated income tax adjustment is implemented in two steps: 1) the policy
ﬁnanced by a beneﬁt-offsetting (distribution-neutral) income tax adjustment, as
described throughout this essay; 2) a purely redistributive income tax adjustment,
that is, a reform under which the hypothetical beneﬁt-offsetting tax adjustment
from step 1 is replaced by the actual tax adjustment. This decomposition yields
substantial gains from specialization. Those most knowledgeable about environ-
mental regulation, health care, education policy, and so forth can focus their
efforts on step 1, examining factors peculiar to those subjects when applying
standard cost-beneﬁt tests. Others can study step 2, concerned purely with income
redistribution, by reﬁning models of redistributive taxation, obtaining better esti-
mates of the labor supply elasticity and the distribution of earning abilities, and
addressing the question of the appropriate social welfare function; the results of
such studies can be applied generically, to all manner of government action.
Without such a two-step decomposition, the outcome of any particular study,
10 Readers familiar with principles of Ramsey taxation—the inverse elasticity rule on efﬁciency grounds
and the preference for higher taxes on luxuries and lower taxes on necessities on distributive grounds—
may ﬁnd such dictates contradicted by the explanation in the text. This is indeed the case. As Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) explain, Ramsey results and applications based thereon must be largely cast aside if
the instrument of an income tax is available. See also Stiglitz (1987).
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analysis and empirical estimates pertinent to the gasoline tax increase per se;
2) what particular tax adjustment is postulated; 3) the analysis and empirical
estimates pertinent to redistributive taxation; and 4) the choice of social welfare
function to aggregate all effects. When these elements are entangled, the task of
interpreting a single study or comparing studies that disagree will be quite difﬁcult
even for specialists and probably impossible for less technically sophisticated poli-
cymakers. This problem is compounded when results are produced using complex
general equilibrium simulation models where numerous details pertaining to all of
the four categories must be absorbed to comprehend how each issue is being
addressed. With the proposed two-step decomposition, differences in conclusions
of studies of gasoline tax increases would then all be attributable to category 1; the
resulting enhancement of conceptual clarity should greatly facilitate progress in
research as well as understanding by outsiders.
There are also practical virtues of the proposed approach. The most obvious
beneﬁt is that the two steps of the decomposition not only are distinguishable
conceptually but also can be separated in practice. For example, when the ﬁrst step
of a composite reform—the government action in itself—is desirable and the
second—the redistributive change—is unwanted, only the ﬁrst step need be
adopted; a policymaker would not, however, know when this is the case if policy
analysts present results only for the composite package. In addition, separate
identiﬁcation of redistributive effects and their associated labor supply distortion
helps to keep policymakers from being misled, as such may result from many
current studies that examine only distribution or only labor supply distortion. For
example, more labor supply distortion, naturally presented as an evil in much of
the second-wave literature, is symptomatic of greater redistribution—a net good to
those who favor additional redistribution and a partially offsetting good even to
many who favor less. Likewise, adjusting simple policy tests solely for redistributive
effects is misleading in the opposite direction.
If one is optimistic, or perhaps naive, one might hope that clear presentation
of the results from distribution-neutral policy analysis would improve government
decision-making by reducing the extent to which general distributive politics
interfere with the ability to implement socially beneﬁcial policies. If distribution-
neutral analysis reveals a policy to be efﬁcient, enactment—speciﬁcally of the
distribution-neutral package—may be more likely to be feasible because, as ex-
plained, all income groups will be winners. Likewise, when a policy is inefﬁcient,
all groups would be losers, rendering enactment more difﬁcult. Of course, the
political process is far more complicated than this, and, as previously noted, there
exists heterogeneity among individuals that is unrelated to differences in income
levels. Nevertheless, if economic policy analysts consistently present results for
distribution-neutral policy combinations, which clearly identify which proposals are
efﬁcient and which are not, perhaps this would enhance the quality of public
decision-making.
Whether or not policies will be ﬁnanced in a manner that is overall distribution
Louis Kaplow 173neutral, it remains the case that the proposed approach to policy analysis has many
virtues, conceptual and practical, that favor its widespread use by economists as a
benchmark for policy analysis. It would clarify existing thinking and teaching. It
would facilitate the analysis of underlying government policies, like provision of
particular types of public goods and enactment of various environmental regula-
tions. It would sharpen our understanding of redistributive, distortionary labor
income taxation. Finally, the proposed approach would enhance policymakers’
ability to digest economic policy analysis and thus may improve the quality of
economic policy.
y The author is grateful to Alan Auerbach, James Hines, Steven Shavell, Andrei Shleifer,
Timothy Taylor, Michael Waldman, David Weisbach, and workshop participants for com-
ments, Amy Sheridan for research assistance, and the John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics, and Business at Harvard University for ﬁnancial support. The issues explored
here are developed in greater depth in Taxation and Redistribution, a book in progress.
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